We compute the potential economic benefits that would accrue to a typical pre-WWII era US worker from the post-WWII macroeconomic policy regime.
Introduction
In this paper we assess the gain in welfare resulting from changes in the character of US business cycles between the pre-and post-WWII eras. The question we ask is: what fraction of consumption would a typical US industrial worker from the pre-WWII era give up (in perpetuity) to live under the post-WWII stochastic processes for de-trended income and price level? Our welfare calculation is in the spirit of Lucas's (1987) calculation of the welfare cost of business cycles in that our intent is to obtain an estimate of the welfare gains resulting from the change in the macroeconomic policy regime between the pre-and post-WWII eras.
That there was a major change in macroeconomic policy regime between the pre-WWII era (defined in this paper as the period 1875-1941) and the post-WWII period has been documented by economic historians (Temin (1989) ). In the pre-WWII era, macroeconomic policies in the US and other European countries were aimed primarily at maintaining the external value of domestic currency, defined as the amount of gold a unit of currency could purchase. The governments of countries participating in this "gold standard regime" were required to maintain convertibility between their domestic currency and gold at some fixed exchange rate. Since the ability to maintain convertibility depended crucially on the government's having adequate reserves of gold, protecting gold reserves took precedence over other macroeconomic objectives. Indeed, there are many instances in US monetary history where the concern with maintaining parity with gold determined key policy actions.
In contrast, the focus of macroeconomic policies in the post-WWII era has been on domestic, as opposed to external, stability. 1 In the United States, this focus on domestic stability manifested itself in three broad classes of aggregative policies: (i) automatic stabilizers that shored up aggregate demand during cyclical downturns (income maintenance programs such as unemployment insurance and progressive income taxation), (ii) policies aimed at averting financial crises (such as insurance of bank deposits and the Federal
Reserve's activities as lender of last resort), and (iii) discretionary aggregate demand management policies (such as countercyclical monetary and fiscal actions). The first two classes of policies were instituted during the Depression years, and the authority to undertake the third was written into the Full Employment Act of 1946.
The question addressed in this paper is: what difference did this change in regime make to the typical US industrial worker? Ideally, this question would be answered by constructing a model in which the change in macroeconomic policy arrangement is explicitly modelled and its ramifications for economic welfare (and other operating characteristics of the economy) worked out.
Instead, we take a more elementary approach. We use a simple model of consumer behavior to "identify" changes in key operating characteristics of the US economy between the two eras and ask how these changes affected economic welfare of a typical worker. Obviously, the changes in operating 1 Although the post-WWII period started out with an international monetary arrangement of fixed exchange rates (the Bretton Woods Agreement), the agreement failed to stand the test of time. Indeed, scholars have argued that the arrangement was flawed from the beginning because of the unwillingness of US officials to accept provisions that entailed sacrificing domestic interests in favor of international stability.
characteristics we identify reflect, in part, factors unrelated to changes in the policy regime. So, the welfare effects we report cannot all be attributed to changes in the policy regime. To minimize this ambiguity we do our welfare calculations in several steps, starting with changes we are confident reflect a change in the policy regime, then proceeding to analyze the effects of changes that we are less confident were caused by the change in policy regime.
The model of consumer behavior we use is a variant of the model studied by Imrohoroglu (1989) . The model abstracts from economic growth and assumes that each individual faces an idiosyncratic risk of unemployment against which insurance is not possible. Importantly, the probability of employment and the level of real earnings when employed are lower when economic activity is cyclically low, and they are both higher when economic activity is cyclically high. As a precaution against these fluctuations in income (due both to fluctuations in employment status and in earnings when employed), agents self-insure through the holding of money. Because individuals save in nominal assets, the cyclical and secular behavior of the price level is important to the consumer. Thus, in this model of consumer behavior, the two stochastic processes that matter for individual welfare are the ones for (de-trended) income and for the level of consumer prices.
Briefly, our findings are as follows. In the pre-WWII era, a typical industrial worker endured business cycles that were large in amplitude and quite volatile, a procyclical aggregate price level with large cyclical amplitude, a high unemployment rate on average, and virtually no trend in the aggregate price level. In the post-WWII era, industrial workers encountered business cycles with smaller amplitude and less volatility, a countercyclical aggregate price level with small cyclical amplitude, a much lower unemployment rate on average, and a positive trend in the aggregate price level. When we confront the pre-WWII individual with stochastic processes for income and prices from the post-WWII era, we find that the individual is willing to pay 4.19 percent of his consumption in perpetuity to live under the new regime.
In what ways did the change in macroeconomic policy regime contribute to this overall gain in welfare? First, we assume that the post-WWII policy regime was a key factor in the post-WWII inflation rate. This is consistent with the view that the post-WWII policy regime gave US policymakers discretion in setting domestic monetary policy. We estimate the welfare loss from post-WWII inflation to be 0.9 percent of consumption (in perpetuity).
Second, we assume that the shift in policy regime had some role in reducing the volatility in real economic activity. Given the importance attached to domestic stability by the post-WWII regime, this would seem a reasonable assumption. It is generally accepted that volatility in real economic activity (real GNP, consumer expenditures, the unemployment rate, etc.) was higher during the pre-WWII period as compared to the post-WWII period (Zarnowitz (1992) ). Although many factors contributed to this change, it seems reasonable to assume that some of that reduction happened because of policies such as automatic stabilizers and the Fed's lender-of-last-resort activities. We estimate the gain in welfare from this source to be 0.13 percent of consumption (in perpetuity). cycles is assumed to affect the probability of unemployment at the level of the individual worker. If the elimination of business cycles merely removes the correlation between changes in employment status of different workers, the gain in welfare will be nonexistent or very small. 3 In contrast to these 2 We do not evaluate the welfare effects of the mean growth rate of consumption between the two eras. 3 Atkeson and Phelan provide an ingenious model in support of their contention that stabilization policies may merely remove the correlation between changes in employment studies, our calculations are based on actual changes in cyclical volatility between the pre-and post-WWII eras. 4 To that extent, they are subject to less ambiguity than the ones performed by Imrohoroglu and Krusell and Smith.
Nevertheless, the ambiguities stressed by Atkeson and Phelan and Krusell and Smith resurface when we attempt to relate the changes in the business cycle environment (i.e., changes in means as well as volatility) to the changes in macroeconomic policies between the two eras. Indeed, one of the lessons of our study is that changes in the mean unemployment rate and the mean duration of unemployment spells (in good and bad times) are the two factors that an individual worker cares most about. If there are good reasons to think that macroeconomic policies pursued in the post-WWII era did not affect these aspects of the worker's environment (i.e., the declines in the mean unemployment rate and the mean duration of unemployment spells that did occur in the post-WWII period happened for reasons unrelated to macroeconomic policies), then macroeconomic policies probably had a negative effect on individual welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief description of the pre-WWII macroeconomic policy regime and its likely implications for the volatility of economic activity. Section 3 describes the economic environment we study. Section 4 contains the calibration of the model to the status of workers. Krusell and Smith assume this is so and focus on welfare consequences of the general equilibrium price effects of elimination of aggregate variability. 4 Our finding that changes in cyclical environment contributed a 0.8 percent gain in welfare assumes a risk aversion parameter of 1.5 and is thus comparable to Imrohorglu's finding of a 0.3 percent gain in welfare.
pre-and post-WWII macroeconomic environments. Section 5 contains the key findings and section 6 concludes. European unemployment rates rose and economic activity weakened. This time, though, the political backlash against deflationary policies was severe.
As the depth of political opposition became increasingly clear, country after country fell victim to speculative attacks on their currencies and were forced to suspend convertibility. Although the United States maintained convertibility throughout this tumultuous period, the inability of key European countries to make the gold standard work was probably an important contributing factor to the uncertainties that prevailed during the Great Depression.
Thus, for the US, the entire period from 1870 to the beginning of the Second World War was characterized by monetary and financial volatility.
This monetary volatility was charted by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) in their celebrated book. The point of the brief discussion of the pre-WWI gold standard regime, and the interwar attempt to resurrect it, is to emphasize that pre-WWII macroeconomic policies were aimed primarily at maintaining convertibility of the dollar rather than at domestic stability. This "overriding" objective of maintenance of a stable currency is the backdrop against which the pre-WWII volatility in US monetary, financial, and real activity needs to be placed.
Environment
Our environment builds on work by Imrohoroglu (1989) . The economy evolves through good (g) and bad (b) times, which have implications for employment prospects, earnings, and the prices at which agents purchase commodities. The state of the economy n ∈ {g, b} is assumed to follow a first order Markov process. The transition matrix of n is given by:
where, for example,
The economy consists of a large number of infinitely lived agents who differ at any point in time in their cash balances and employment opportunities.
They maximize
where 0 < β < 1 is their discount factor and c t is their consumption in period t. The utility function is given by
Agents are endowed with one indivisible unit of time each period. Each agent receives an employment opportunity that is independent across agents.
The employment opportunity has two states, i = e, u. If the employed state occurs i = e, an agent produces y n units of the consumption good in state n. If the unemployed state occurs i = u, an agent produces θy n units of the consumption good through household production in state n, where 0 < θ < 1.
The individual-specific employment state is assumed to follow a first order Markov process. The transition matrix is given by:
where, for example, Pr{i t+1 = e|i t = u, n t+1 = g} = λ g eu is the probability that an agent will be employed in good times at t + 1, given the agent was unemployed in period t.
The overall employment prospects faced by each individual depends on both the aggregate and individual states; that is, s = {n, i}. , where
The transition probabilities are determined by Λ and Λ n . For example, if s t = s 1 , then the probability of s t+1 = s 2 , i.e., φ 21 , is given by λ gg λ g ue .
While event-contingent insurance is not permitted, agents can insure themselves through holdings of money. Agents enter period t with individual nominal money holdings M t held over from the previous period. The nominal price of consumption goods at time t in state n is given by P n t . Then an agent's budget constraint can be written:
We assume that P n t = (1 + π) t P n so we can re-write the agent's budget constraint as: 
subject to
Since agents face idiosyncratic shocks, they may hold different levels of money. Let µ t (m, s) be the probability that an individual attains state (m, s) in period t. Then, given the decision rule m 0 (m, s), the probability that
where
Under mild regularity conditions (ergodicity of the Markov process and the absence of cyclically moving subsets), the sequence of recursively defined distributions converges to a unique invariant distribution µ(m, s) from any initial distribution.
Calibration
The calibration of this environment involves selecting parameter values for two broad groups of variables: (i) aggregative variables, including the aggregate state transition matrix Λ, the average inflation rate π, and the detrended price levels P n , and (ii) the individual-level variables, including the individual state transition matrix Λ n , the individual-level real earnings y(s), and the preference parameters β and σ.
A challenging aspect of this calibration is that we need to do it for both the pre-and post-WWII eras. This means assembling long time series (stretching back into the nineteenth century) on as many relevant variables as possible.
We succeeded in obtaining long time series on real GNP 6 , the CPI 7 , and real earnings 8 going back to the late or mid-nineteenth century and on the 6 The series for quarterly real GNP was assembled from the following sources: (i) for 1875.1 -1983.4 from the real GNP series reported in Table 2 , Appendix B of Gordon (1986);
for 1984.1-1997.4 from NIPA. 7 The series for annual CPI ('all items') was assembled by linking together the series obtained from the following sources. For 1851-1880, from The Aggregate State Transition Matrix
We used the time series on quarterly real GNP to determine the aggregate state transition matrix. We began with the time series on the logarithm of quarterly real GNP between 1875.1 and 1997.4 and extracted fluctuations at business cycle frequencies using the band-pass filter recommended by Baxter and King (1995) . Because the extraction distorts business cycle components at the end points of a sample period, the recommended band-pass filter drops three years of data at both the beginning and the end of the sample period.
We propose measuring the expected duration of "good" and "bad" times in the pre-and post-WWII eras by classifying any quarter in which real GNP was above trend as being a "good time" and any quarter in which it was below trend as being a "bad time." The average duration of good and bad times in the two eras is taken as an estimate of the expected duration of good and bad times in the two eras. In view of this, we eliminated the first six and the last two quarters of the detrended series because they belonged to episodes of bad times whose beginning and ending dates, respectively, are not of nonfarm production workers multiplied by 52 x the average weekly hours worked by nonfarm production workers (both series provided by the BLS). The resulting series was adjusted by the annual CPI series to give the real earnings series. 9 The series for the unemployment rate was assembled from the following sources: For known. We also wanted to maintain equal numbers of good and bad times over the entire period so we terminated our sample at 1994.3, the quarter in which the most recent episode of bad times ended.
Inspection of the de-trended series shows that the economic boom asso- The fact that the duration of spells of below-trend economic activity lengthened during the post-WWII era may seem odd in light of the conventional wisdom that the duration of contractionary spells (as dated by the NBER) has fallen in the post-WWII era. Note, however, that the NBER's "expansion-contraction" classification scheme is different from ours in that an NBER expansion begins in a trough and ends in a peak. Thus, it includes periods of both below-trend and above-trend economic activity. Furthermore, the fact that both good and bad times have lasted longer in the post-WWII era is consistent with evidence that fluctuations in real GNP became more persistent after WWII (see, for instance, DeLong and Summers (1988)). 10 From the information in the top panel of Table 1 , the diagonal elements of the aggregate state transition matrix for the two eras were computed using the fact that
The fact that each row of each transition matrix sums to 1 then determined the off-diagonal elements.
These matrices are displayed in the bottom panel of Table 1 . The De-trended Price Levels
We used annual time series on the CPI to determine the de-trended price levels P n . We began with the time series on the logarithm of the CPI from 1851 to 1997 and extracted its business cycle components using the recommended band-pass filter for annual data. Once again, the recommended filter drops three years of data at the beginning and the end of the sample period.
dates after 1927 are based on data in levels. According to Romer (1994) , removing this inconsistency makes the NBER reference cycles show a lengthening of the contractionary spells between the pre-WWI and post-WWII eras as well. The average duration of a contractionary spell goes from 9.7 months in the pre-WWI era to 10.9 in the post-WWII era.
Romer's dates also indicate that the average duration of a cycle went from a little under 42 months in the pre-WWI period to a little over 62 months in the post-WWII period. If we view consecutive episodes of good and bad times as a business "cycle," our filter-based classification scheme also implies that the duration of the business cycle lengthened from a little over 41 months in the pre-WWII era to a little over 57 months in the post-WWII era.
As a first step toward determining P n , we ran separate regressions of detrended CPI on annual de-trended real GNP (where annual de-trended real GNP was created using the same procedure as that for de-trended CPI) for the pre-and post-WWII eras. Second, the coefficient on real GNP (which measures the elasticity of price with respect to output) was multiplied by the average deviation from trend of real GNP in good and bad times in the two eras. This led to the finding that, on average, the difference in detrended price levels between good and bad times was 1.68 percentage points in the pre-WWII era but −0.65 percentage points in the post-WWII era.
Thus consumer prices were procyclical and more volatile in the pre-WWII period, but countercyclical and much less volatile in the post-WWII period.
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Finally, the values of P n , n = g, b, for each era was determined by setting the unconditional expected value of the price level to 1 in both eras. For instance, for the pre-WWII era, P g and P b are chosen to satisfy 1 = λ g P g + λ b P b and
0168, where λ n denotes the unconditional probability of being in state n = g, b.
The resulting values of P n are displayed in the top panel of Table 2 . 
The finding that the cyclical behavior of the (de-trended) price level changed between the pre-and post-WWII era confirms the earlier findings of Cooley and Ohanian (1991).
Cooley and Ohanian did not examine the CPI series used in this study, and they did not use a band-pass filter to de-trend their series.
The Inflation Rate
We used the average CPI inflation rate between 1851 and 1941 as the average inflation rate for the pre-WWII era and the average CPI inflation rate between 1942 and 1997 as the average inflation rate for the post-WWII period. At an annual rate, these inflation rates were 0.66 percent and 4.16 percent, respectively. These values are noted in the bottom panel of Table 2 .
The Individual-Level State Transition Matrix
For each era, the individual-level state transition matrix is built up from two pieces of information: the average unemployment rate in good and bad times and the average duration of unemployment spells in good and bad times.
The average unemployment rate in good and bad times in the pre-WWII era was determined using a procedure similar to that for determining the de-trended price levels in good and bad times. We regressed the annual unemployment rate for the period 1900-1941 on a constant term and annual de-trended real GNP. The estimate of the constant term, which came out to be 10.65 percent, was taken to be a measure of the average unemployment rate for the pre-WWII era. The estimated coefficient on real GNP was multiplied by the difference in the average deviation from trend between good and bad times in real GNP to give a measure of the difference in unemployment rates between good and bad times in the pre-WWII era. The difference was −7.16 percentage points. The unemployment rates in good and bad times (denoted as U g and U b , respectively) were then determined by the requirement that the unconditional unemployment rate in the pre-WWII era equal 10.65 percent (i.e., by the requirement that 0.1065
This implied an average unemployment rate of 7.24 percent in good times and 14.41 percent in bad times (Table 3 ).
12 Table 3 -Unemployment Rates and Durations high (a depressed year) while that in 1890 was relatively low (a prosperous year). Thus, the duration statistics from the two censuses give us some indication of how the length of unemployment spells varied between bad and good times in the late nineteenth century. 12 Since these estimates are based on unemployment rates for 1900-1941, they are heavily influenced by the Depression. Thus, it's possible that our procedure exaggerates the volatility of unemployment rates and their average value for the pre-WWII era. On the other hand, the scattered evidence on late nineteenth century industrial unemployment does suggest that the average unemployment rate during this period was quite high and that the unemployment rate was very volatile (Lebergott (1964, Table 5 . On the basis of this scattered information on duration of unemployment in the pre-WWII period, we tentatively set the average duration of unemployment to four months in bad times and two months in good times for the pre-WWII era.
Fixing the average duration of unemployment in good and bad times allows us to pin down λ . Next, note that the evolution of the aggregate unemployment rate is given by:
where n(t) ∈ {g, b}. Since λ n uu etc. depend only on the current state, we may expect U t to converge to some constant if the state remains unchanged for some length of time. We choose λ n ue , n = g, b, so that:
This choice implies that in our model the average unemployment rate in good times is somewhat larger than U g and the average unemployment rate in bad times is somewhat less than U b . However, since both the good and bad states are highly persistent, these discrepancies are minor.
The Λ n matrix for the post-WWII period was determined in a similar way. Since we have quarterly data for this period, we regressed the quarterly unemployment rate on a constant term and de-trended quarterly real GNP. as 1 − 1/1.96. The remaining elements of the Λ n matrices were determined following the same procedure as for the pre-WWII case. These parameters are summarized in Table 6 . 
De-Trended Earnings
To determine the earnings process for the two eras, we began with a series on the average real annual earnings of nonfarm workers for the period 1860-1997. We took logarithms of the series and extracted its business cycle component using the recommended band-pass filter for annual data. Again, three years of data were dropped at each end of the sample.
To determine earnings in the employed state during good and bad times in the pre-WWII era, we regressed de-trended real earnings on de-trended annual real GNP for the period 1878-1941. The coefficient on real GNP (which measures the elasticity of real earnings with respect to real GNP) when multiplied by the average difference between real GNP in good and bad times implies a difference of 0.95 percent in real earnings between good and bad times. A similar procedure for the post-WWII period revealed that the difference in real earnings between good and bad times was 1.94 percent. Thus, real earnings were less volatile in the pre-WWII as compared to the post-WWII era. This result is driven by the different behavior of de-trended prices in the two eras. Since prices were procyclical in the pre-WWII era, they partially countered the procyclical movement in nominal earnings; no such offset occurred in the post-WWII era. These differences in earnings in good and bad times and the requirement that the unconditional mean of earnings be 1 in both eras allowed us to pin down the value of y n , n = g, b,for both eras. These values are noted in the top panel of Table 7 . ner. With these facts in mind, we tentatively assume that in the pre-WWII era, the earnings of an unemployed worker was a quarter of that of an employed worker.
In the post-WWII era, all laid-off workers are eligible for unemployment benefits. However, our interest is not in the welfare effects of unemployment insurance per se, but on the effects that such insurance may have had on the stability of aggregate demand and, hence, on the aggregate unemployment rate and other macroeconomic variables. 13 For this reason, we maintain the same earnings loss from unemployment in the post-WWII era as in the pre-WWII era.
Compound Transition Matrix
Given Λ and Λ n , it is possible to construct Φ. This is given in Table 8 . 
Preference Parameters
Following Imrohoroglu, we set β = 0.9967 and σ = 1.5. 13 The welfare effects of unemployment insurance have been analyzed for this class of models in Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) .
Findings

A Welfare Comparison of the Pre-and Post-WWII Eras
We obtain decision rules for optimal money holdings by successive approximations on the value function V (m, s). Following Imrohoroglu (1989), we discretize the state space of money holdings to lie between 0 and 8.1 in increments of 0.027 for a total of 301 grid points. 14 The upper bound, again the same as in Imrohoroglu, is roughly equal to eight months of income if the employed state continues for that long. In equilibrium, this constraint is never binding. We found that the sequence of decision rules typically converged after 500 iterations. 15 We denote the value function for the pre-WWII stochastic processes for income and prices as V pre (m, s) and that for the post-WWII stochastic processes as V post (m, s).
We are interested in the welfare gain experienced by pre-WWII individuals from changes in the stochastic process for income and prices that occurred during the post-WWII period. If the changes were improvements, we would expect V post (m, s) to exceed V pre (m, s). For an individual in state (m, s), the improvement could be expressed in terms of consumption by computing γ
is the fraction of consumption the individual can give up every period in an environment 14 We also doubled the number of grid points and found no appreciable differences from what is presented in the text. 15 We used a sup norm convergence criterion, stopping when max m,s
characterized by post-WWII stochastic processes without his utility falling below that available to him in the pre-WWII environment. Denoting the invariant measure for the pre-WWII environment by µ pre (m, s) (this distribution gives the unconditional probability of a worker's having money m in state s in the pre-WWII environment), the average gain in utility to pre-WWII individuals is given by γ = P m,s µ pre (m, s)γ(m, s). Table 9 Table 9 also reports the welfare gain between the two regimes from a "steady state" perspective. In this calculation (denoted by 1 − γ ss ) we first determine γ ss (m, s) to satisfy V pre (m, s) = γ We should also note that operating characteristics of the pre-WWII regime lends some support to our choice of earnings loss from unemployment. Recall that we set earnings when unemployed to a quarter of earnings when employed (h = 0.25). This choice implied an average holdings of money balances of 3.74 months of income. According to Friedman and Schwartz (Table A-5, p. 774), the US economy held, on average 2.67 months of (national) income as balances in currency and checking accounts in 1915 (the midpoint, roughly, of the pre-WWII era). Assuming that two-thirds of national income accrues to labor, their findings imply that the economy held four months of national labor income as balances. Since some portion of currency and checking deposits were held by firms, these facts suggest that an average money holding of 3.74 months for the pre-WWII era is reasonable.
Welfare Gains and the Role of Post-WWII Macroeconomic Policy Regime
We turn now to finding out how much of this increase in welfare can reasonably be ascribed to the change in the macroeconomic policy regime between the two eras.
Welfare Effects of Post-WWII Inflation
As noted earlier, most macroeconomists would agree that the macroeconomic policy arrangement in the post-WWII era was an important cause of higher inflation during the 1960s and 1970s. Thus, our first (thought) experiment is to ask: how much would a pre-WWII individual have to be paid to live in a world that resembles the pre-WWII environment in all respects except that it has the post-WWII inflation rate? The results are displayed in Table 10 . The loss in welfare of an increase in the annual inflation rate from 0.66 percent to 4.16 percent is 0.99 percent of individual consumption in perpetuity. As deadweight losses go, this is a fairly large reduction in welfare. Note that the steady-state reduction in welfare is even larger, with welfare being lower by 1.35 percent of consumption in perpetuity. Again, the steady-state calculation gives a lower figure because it does not take into account the reduction in the average money holdings from 3.74 months of income to 2.73 months of income 
Welfare Effects of Changes in Cyclical Volatility
In this section we attempt to evaluate the potential welfare gains from reduction in cyclical volatility between the two eras. As noted earlier, the shift in the focus of macroeconomic policies from external to domestic stability probably reduced post-WWII cyclical volatility.
In this thought experiment we situate the worker in an environment in which the mean unemployment rate and the mean inflation rate is identical to that in the pre-WWII era, but the persistence of aggregate states, the variance of the aggregate unemployment rate, and the cyclical behavior of 16 Anticipated inflation also imposes costs stemming from distortion of the capital accumulation decision and labor-leisure choice, which are not being taken into account here.
prices and real earnings are those from the post-WWII period. In particular, in this hypothetical world, U g and U b are 9.89 and 11.52 percent, respectively (so that the mean unemployment rate is 10.65 percent (the same as in the pre-WWII period) but the difference between good and bad states is 1.63 percentage points (that of the post-WWII period) ). These aggregate unemployment rates in good and bad times were coupled with the "appropriate" Λ g and Λ b matrices. We used the observed relationship between the probability of continuing in the unemployed state (or, equivalently, the duration of unemployment spells) and aggregate unemployment rates to "back out" the probability of continuing in the unemployed state for aggregate unemployment rates of 9.89 and 11.52 percent. Our procedure implied that for an aggregate unemployment rate of 9.89 percent, the probability of continuing in the unemployed state is 0.5752 and for an aggregate unemployment rate of 11.52 percent the probability of continuing in the unemployed state is 0.6439. The other elements of the individual-level transition matrices were determined following the procedure described for pre-WWII (and post-WWII) Λ g and Λ b matrices.
As noted in Table 11 , pre-WWII individuals are willing to pay 0.13 percent of individual consumption in perpetuity to live under these, less volatile, income and price processes. When attention is confined to steady states, the individual worker is willing to give up 0.008 percent of consumption. The negligible steady gain in welfare suggests that the 0.13 percent gain in welfare is probably entirely due to the fact that the individuals held somewhat less money balances in the new, less volatile steady state (3.41 months of income as opposed to 3.74 months of income) These are strikingly small numbers. It appears, therefore, that the welfare gains from the post-WWII reduction of business cycle volatility are quite small. In particular, they are smaller than the welfare loss from higher post-WWII inflation. The fundamental reason for these small welfare gains is that individuals can self-insure effectively by holding precautionary balances. As a result, they do not put a high premium on reduction in volatility per se. We find this result of some significance because of the ongoing controversy about how volatile the pre-WWII era really was. In two influential papers, Christina Romer (1986a Romer ( ,1986b has argued that the high volatility of pre-WWII data, in particular the pre-WWI data, is spurious and is caused by biases in the construction of the data. 17 Our finding suggests that the 17 The data series we use include ones that Romer has criticized, in particular, the ones for real GNP and the unemployment rate.
resolution of this debate may have little consequence for the evaluation of macroeconomic policies. The evaluation of macroeconomic policies must be ultimately related back to the individuals they affect. Even if the post-WWII era was as volatile as the "official" data series suggest, we cannot ignore the possibility that pre-WWII individuals may have neutralized that volatility by adapting to it in various ways. In the simple model analyzed here, the adaptation takes the form of holding higher precautionary balances. Table 11 (1988)). While that may be so, our thought experiment shows that the change in persistence itself had negligible welfare effects.
Welfare Effects of Changes in Mean Unemployment Rate
Our final thought experiment is to situate the pre-WWII worker in an environment in which the inflation rate, the variance of the aggregate unem-ployment rate, the persistence of aggregate states, and the cyclical behavior or the price level and real earnings are the same as in the pre-WWII era but the mean unemployment rate is the same as in the post-WWII era. In particular, in this hypothetical world U g and U b are 2.57 and 9.73 percent, respectively (so that the mean unemployment rate is 5.91 percent (that of the post-WWII era) but the difference between good and bad states is 7.16 percentage points (that of the pre-WWII era)). These aggregate unemployment rates were "matched up" with probability of continuing in the unemployed state of 0.2657 and 0.5683, respectively.
As shown in Table 12 , the pre-WWII individual would be willing to give Thus, the overall gain in welfare of 4.19 percent between the pre-and post-WWII eras stems mostly from a reduction in the mean unemployment rate. 18 Thus, the validity of the proposition that post-WWII policy regime improved welfare rests on these policies' having lowered the average unemployment rate. Again, this is informative in that macroeconomists haven't directed any attention to understanding why the average unemployment rate fell so much between the pre-and post-WWII eras. Our findings suggest that it is important to find out how much of the decline in the unemployment rate can be attributed to macroeconomic policies.
Conclusions
We computed the potential economic benefits that would accrue to a typical pre-WWII era US worker from the post-WWII macroeconomic policy regime. 18 A sum of the welfare gains (and losses) from changes in the inflation rate, cyclical volatility, and mean unemployment rate is 3.58 percent. The discrepancy between this sum and the overall gain in welfare of 4.19 percent reflects the fact that post-WWII inflation has less of an adverse effect on welfare when unemployment risk is at the lower post-WWII level rather than the higher pre-WWII level.
We assumed that workers face undiversifiable income risk but can self-insure by saving in nominal assets. The worker's average utility is computed for two eras: pre-WWII (1875-1941) and post-WWII. In the pre-WWII era, the worker endured business cycles that were large in amplitude and quite volatile, a procyclical aggregate price level with large cyclical amplitude, a high average unemployment rate, and virtually no trend in the aggregate price level. In the post-WWII era, the same worker would have encountered business cycles with smaller amplitude and less volatility, a countercyclical aggregate price level with small cyclical amplitude, a much lower mean unemployment rate, and a positive trend in the aggregate price level. We 
